Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective思维导图

Changes in the structure of Chinese investors, from non circulation to circulation, from individuals to institutions

Functions and Powers of the China Securities Regulatory Commission

Dual board structure and respective responsibilities

The right of shareholders

Rules for controlling shareholders

Rules for Directors and Board of Directors

Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board

Performance evaluation and other related content of directors, supervisors, and management personnel

Establishment time and responsibilities of SASAC

Reform from non Shares outstanding to Shares outstanding

The proportion of major shareholders in China is high, but it is decreasing year by year

State owned enterprises have fewer management shares, while non-state-owned enterprises have more management shares

Increase in institutional holdings of corporate stocks

Increase in independent directors in the board of directors

Chinese CEOs are often not chairman

Salaries for management and board of directors in China are increasing

The salary of state-owned enterprise management is often lower than that of non-state-owned enterprise management

Chinese enterprises have higher load capacity than European and American enterprises

Chinese companies have lower dividend payments

Major shareholders in China

The primary role of independent directors is different in China

Salary is not an important motivational factor for state-owned enterprise managers

Debt and dividends are (non) moderating factors for China's agency costs

CEOs are often not the ones with control

Weak legal environment

Institutional investors in China are unlikely to undergo regulation

Labor market, control market, and product market

Chinese enterprises engage in corporate social responsibility to establish political relationships

Cross listing may improve corporate governance of Chinese companies